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Professor J E Penner has assumed responsibility for McCoubrey and 
White’s Textbook on Jurisprudence, in the form of the new 4th edition. 
Previous editions were well structured, clear and wide ranging introductions 
to a difficult subject, and in these respects Penner’s 4th edition is no different. 
The main changes are twofold. First, there is more detailed exploration of 
certain topics; secondly, there is a broadening of subject matter through the 
inclusion of theoretical schools unaddressed by previous editions. Overall, the 
4th edition is a significant improvement on its predecessors and Penner is to be 
congratulated for making a good textbook better.  
The way the subject of jurisprudence is divided by the textbook follows 
tradition. Thus the chapter titles include ‘Classical Natural Law’, ‘Classical 
Legal Positivism: Bentham, Austin and Kelsen’, ‘Legal Realism’, ‘Hart: The 
Critical Project’, ‘Critical Legal Studies’ and ‘The Economic Analysis of 
Law’. What are new to this edition are the chapters ‘Marxist Theories of Law’ 
and ‘Feminist Legal Theory’; these new chapters address important schools of 
thought and are therefore welcome additions. Overall, the textbook is 
comprehensive and versatile and should, as a result, find itself on the reading 
list of many jurisprudence courses. 
Jurisprudence is complex subject, requiring a level of philosophical 
sophistication unmatched by anything else on the undergraduate law 
curriculum. In light of this it is challenging to teach at undergraduate level. If 
a textbook is to assist with this challenge, it must make the topic 
comprehensible without excessive omission and/or distortion in the name of 
simplification. This is a difficult balancing act and Penner’s textbook 
accomplishes it well. For example, the chapter on classical natural law does 
justice to the richness of the subject whilst remaining accessible; particularly 
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welcome is the informative discussion of Islamic law.1 The nature of 
American legal realism is clearly explained, with succinct biographies of 
Holmes, Llewellyn and Frank followed by thematic analysis. The chapter on 
the critical legal studies movement gives an accurate yet succinct flavour of 
this radical descendant of American legal realism, and does not shy away 
from engagement with the complex work of Roberto Unger. Also noteworthy 
is the illuminating distinction Penner sets out in the opening chapter between 
what he calls the philosophy of law and legal theory.2 In the former he places 
the task of understanding the phenomenon of law in abstract: how is it 
identified? Is it coercive by nature? In what sense does it relate to morality? 
Legal theory, on the other hand, accepts some kind of definition of law but 
addresses, amongst other things, its role in society, whether it is a force for 
good or oppression, and what practical effects it can have. Penner 
acknowledges, correctly, that there is much cross fertilisation between these 
two general categories, but marking the distinction certainly helps to see the 
ways that, for example, the analytical endeavours of Hart and Dworkin differ 
from the more practical and critical concerns of the American legal realists 
and feminist theorists. My only criticism here is that, having set out this useful 
distinction, it is never mentioned again; certainly undergraduate students, at 
whom the book is primarily targeted, could do with occasional reminders of 
its relevance to whatever topic is under analysis. 
Nevertheless, on a few occasions, I felt the textbook would have benefited 
from a more in-depth analysis of the issues it raises. I will focus on two 
instances where that deeper analysis would have been welcome: the 
plausibility of H L A Hart’s approach to legal reasoning, and the concepts of, 
and distinction between, soft and hard positivism. 
An important feature of Hart’s legal theory is his vision of legal 
reasoning, and Penner addresses this vision through Hart’s refutation of rule 
scepticism, during which he summarises the distinction Hart drew between 
the core and penumbra of a rule.3 Hart’s view was that rules are made up of 
words, with those words having a core of determinate, or settled, meaning, 
and a penumbra of indeterminate meaning. From this, Hart inferred that when 
a situation falls within the core meaning, as is the case in most instances, the 
rule settles the dispute without the exercise of discretion, thereby confounding 
the rule sceptic. Only in the penumbra, where the word’s meaning is unclear, 
must the judge exercise discretion, and in such situations he should exhibit 
imagination, flexibility and awareness of social consequences in reaching his 
1 A discussion, at pp 25-34, that is new to this edition.  
2 Pp 1-6.  
3 P 77. Hart’s theory of legal reasoning is also mentioned at p 121. 
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decision.4 In such situations, Hart accepts that the rule sceptic is welcome, but 
argues that this relevance in the penumbra should not blind us to his 
irrelevance at the core.5
Hart’s reference to the core and the penumbra is meant to track a 
distinction between easy cases, where the legal resolution of a case is 
governed by the law unambiguously, and hard cases, where the law is 
ambiguous, and the judge is thereby obliged to exercise discretion in order to 
reach a decision. In such cases, discretion is exercised with the use with non-
legal materials of a moral and practical nature. In such cases the judge does 
not apply existing law, at least not exclusively, but makes new or fresh law.   
Having set out Hart’s refutation of the rule sceptic, Penner draws attention 
to the case of AG v Prince Ernest Augustus of Hanover.6 This case concerned 
the meaning of an antique statute, the Princess Sophia Naturalisation Act 
1705; the Act provided that:  
 
“Princess Sophia...and the Issue of her Body and all Persons lineally 
descending from her, born or hearafter born, be and shall be, to all 
Intents and Purposes whatsoever, deemed, taken, and esteemed 
natural-born Subjects of this Kingdom.” 
 
The Act was the product of constitutional expediency, ensuring that, in light 
of Queen Anne’s childlessness, the next monarch would be British. Prince 
Ernest August of Hanover, a distant descendant of Princess Sophia, claimed 
British nationality under the literal interpretation of the Act, an interpretation 
accepted by the High Court. The Court of Appeal, approaching the Act under 
the golden rule of interpretation, held that such an outcome would be absurd, 
thereby reversing the decision. The House of Lords restored the decision of 
the High Court; Penner comments: “Whatever view may be taken of this case 
and its outcome, it would appear that there was a choice to be made within an 
open-textured provision.”7 Despite the reference to open-texture, I believe 
Penner’s point is that the difference of opinion between, on the one hand, the 
Court of Appeal, and, on the other, the High Court and House of Lords, 
reveals the possibility of discretion despite a situation falling within the core 
of settled meaning of the language used by a rule. This potentially undermines 
Hart’s theory of legal reasoning in important ways, yet, instead of entering 
into an analysis of how this might be, Penner confines himself to the comment 
4 H L A Hart Essays in Jurisprudence and Philosophy (Oxford University Press, 
1983) pp 66-67.  
5 Hart The Concept of Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2nd edn, 1961), chapter VII 
“Formalism and Rule-Scepticism”; see, in particular, p 154.  
6 [1957] AC 436.  
7 P 79. 
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quoted. However, the average undergraduate would certainly benefit from 
such an analysis, in particular an exploration of Lon L Fuller’s criticism of 
Hart that the application of statutory provisions always requires reference to 
their purposes, with the result that the difference between easy and hard cases 
depends not on the determinacy or otherwise of language, but our 
understanding of its meaning in light of those purposes.8  
Similarly, there is failure to engage in sufficient depth with the concepts 
of, and distinction between, soft and hard positivism. Positivism is the thesis 
that the sources of law are exclusively a matter of social fact.9 Soft positivism 
holds that those factual sources can nevertheless make morality a necessary 
condition of legal validity, whereas hard positivism denies the possibility of 
even this contingent relationship between legal validity and morality. Despite 
its importance, soft positivism is only mentioned once, in the context of the 
debate between hard and soft positivists, yet its importance means it merits 
considerably more attention than it receives. For example, not only is it 
relevant to the debate with hard positivism, it also features prominently in 
Hart’s defence of the concept against criticisms levelled by Ronald Dworkin 
at his account of soft positivism and soft positivism generally.10 A summary 
and critique of Hart’s defence of the concept against criticisms levelled by 
Dworkin would not be amiss in a textbook such as this.  
Hard positivism, specifically Joseph Raz’s version thereof, does receive 
more attention.11 Penner explains how Raz justifies his hard positivism by 
reference to a vision of law as a practical authority.12 According to this vision, 
the purpose of law is to mediate between the reasons which apply to the 
subject’s case and the subject, and, having performed this function, to tell the 
subject what to do without any need for the subject to explore what is required 
8 See Lon L Fuller “Positivism and Fidelity to Law” (1958) Harvard Law Review 630 
at 661-669, discussed by Neil Simmonds in Central Issues on Jurisprudence 
(London: Sweet and Maxwell, 3rd edn, 2008) pp 163-164.  
9 See generally John Gardner “Positivism: 51/2 Myths” (2001) 46 American Journal 
of Jurisprudence 199. See also the online entries to the Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy, “Legal Positivism” and “The Nature of Law”, by Leslie Green and 
Andrei Marmor respectively.  
10 See “Postscript”, above n 5, especially pp 250-254.    
11 Pp 135-139.  
12 See for example: The Authority of Law: Essays on Law and Morality (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1979); Ethics in the Public Domain (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994) 
especially chapters 8 and 9 (“The Problem about the Nature of Law” and “Authority, 
Law and Morality”); The Morality of Freedom, especially chapter (“The Justification 
of Authority”); and “Facing Up: A Reply” (1989) 62 Southern California Law Review 
1153–1235.  A very good general discussion of Raz’s hard positivism can be found in 
H Davies and D Holdcroft Jurisprudence: Texts and Commentary (London: 
Butterworths, 1991) chapter 1 “Legal Positivism”.  
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on the balance of reasons. If it cannot do this, with the result that the subject is 
forced back onto an analysis of what to do in light of the relevant reasons, it is 
no longer acting as an authority. To the extent, therefore, that the law does not 
give such clear-cut guidance, it is not fully formed, requiring the judge to 
create, or supplement, the law by reference to extra legal factors of a moral or 
other kind. Hard positivism flows from this vision of law as a practical 
authority because, arguably, the law can only act as an authority when it can 
be identified and applied without recourse to these extra legal factors.13
What is missing from Penner’s analysis is whether Raz’s justification for 
hard positivism is sustainable in light of the reality of legal reasoning, 
including Raz’s acknowledgment that judges often mix law application and 
law creation when deciding cases,14 and also retain a power, within 
institutional limits, to ignore clear law in the name of morality and justice.15 
This need to supplement the law with extra legal factors when deciding cases 
arguably threatens Raz’s justification for hard positivism, because, if it is the 
norm rather than the exception, the frequent reference to extra legal factors 
severely compromises law’s practical utility, with the result that it can no 
longer fulfil its authoritative function. Though this debate is complex, it 
would not be out of place in an undergraduate textbook to give something of 
its flavour, in particular some sense of the criticisms of Raz made by Gerald 
Postema,16 and Raz’s response to those criticisms.17 However, Penner makes 
no mention of the debate.18  
Nevertheless Penner’s willingness to engage with Raz’s is a step in the 
right direction. Striking the balance articulated above between 
comprehensibility and complexity remains a challenge to a large extent unmet 
13 The Authority of Law, see above n 12, pp 49-50. 
14 The Authority of Law, ibid, pp 208-209. See also “On the Nature of Law” (1996) 82 
Archive fur Rechts und Sozialphilosophie 1, and “Why Interpret?” (1996) 9 Ratio 
Juris 349.  
15 “Facing Up”, above n 12, at 1204 and 1208-09.  
16 See Gerald J Postema “Law's Autonomy and Public Practical Reason” in Robert P 
George (ed) The Autonomy of Law: Essays on Legal Positivism (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1999) pp 79-118. Similar criticisms have been made by Fernando 
Atria: see “Legal Reasoning and Legal Theory Revisited” (1999) 18 Law and 
Philosophy 405, also to be found in Fernando Atria and Neil MacCormick (eds) Law 
and Legal Interpretation (International Library of Essays in Law & Legal Theory: 
Second Series) (Vermont: Ashgate Publishing Company, 2003).  
17 “Postema on Law’s Autonomy and Public Practical Reasons: A Critical Comment” 
(1998) 4 Legal Theory 1. 
18 Penner has addressed the jurisprudential issues raised by legal reasoning in Chapter 
14 “Legal Reasoning” in D Schiff and R Nobles (eds) Introduction to Jurisprudence 
and Legal Theory: Commentary and Materials (Oxford: Oxford University Press 
2005) 649. 
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by textbook writers where Raz is concerned, but Penner has made good 
progress in so doing. 
Overall, this is a very good textbook, and one that I would be more than 
happy to recommend to my undergraduate jurisprudence students. It is clearly 
written, and strikes a good balance between accessibility and complexity.  
